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Abstract 
The current research examined the effect of time pressure on risky decision making. Participants 
made choices between accepting and rejecting probabilistic gambles under conditions of high 
time pressure and low time pressure. In order to infer the effect of time pressure on underlying 
cognitive decision making mechanisms, the data were modeled from a cumulative prospect 
theory framework (CPT) (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). It was reasoned that if decisions were 
guided by the same cognitive processes under low and high time pressure, CPT would adequately 
describe decision under high time pressure as well as under low time pressure. Two simpler 
heuristic were suggested as alternative models for decisions under high time pressure. If 
decisions under high time pressure were based on a different cognitive process, the fit of the CPT 
model should be poor, and decisions could be adequately - or even better - described by simpler 
heuristic models that are not subsets of the CPT model. Results showed that time pressure led to 
substantial changes in how participants integrated values and probabilities in their decisions, with 
a general tendency to base decisions on the probability of positive outcomes. It was further found 
that CPT offered a better description for decisions under high time pressure than any of the 
proposed heuristic models. 
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Introduction 
Risky decision making 
Most decisions must be made without certain knowledge about their outcomes. For 
instance, decisions such as whether to accept a new job, investing in the stock market or crossing 
the street all have unpredictable outcomes, that is, they involve components of risk. Besides the 
many potential applied benefits of understanding such decisions, it is of special interest in 
psychology to understand cognitive components guiding behavior under risk. Models such as 
rank dependent expected utility theory (Quiggin, 1992) and cumulative prospect theory (Tversky 
& Kahneman, 1992) account for decisions under risk by describing a single cognitive process that 
integrates values and probabilities in an algorithmic fashion. In the last decade, however, a 
number of experiments have been published that question the generalizability of the 
value*probability approach (Huber, Beutter, Montoya, & Huber, 2001; Huber & Kunz, 2007; 
Tyszka & Zaleskiewicz, 2006; Williamson, Ranyard, & Cuthbert, 2000). Theorists such as 
Gigerenzer have described cognition underlying decision making as a toolbox equipped with 
different strategies evolved for different problems (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996; Todd & 
Gigerenzer, 2007). The aim of the current paper is to investigate time pressure as a possible 
boundary condition, exploring how different decision mechanisms are used under different 
conditions, and thereby aid understanding of a more general account for how decisions work. 
Cumulative prospect theory 
The probably most influential theoretical account of risky decision making is cumulative 
prospect theory (CPT) (Starmer, 2000; Tversky & Fox, 1995; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992; Wu, 
Zhang, & Abdellaoui, 2005; Wu, Zhang, & Gonzalez, 2004). CPT distinguishes two phases in the 
decision making process. First, the decision maker constructs a representation of the information 
relevant to the problem, for instance, identifying the possible outcomes. Second, the decision 
maker assesses the values of each outcome and chooses accordingly. CPT describes this 
valuation process by suggesting that people put subjective weights on values and probabilities 
and that people weight values and probabilities associated with positive outcomes (i.e., gains) 
differently from those associated with negative outcomes (i.e., losses). Further, CPT assumes that 
these outcomes are evaluated against a reference point, so that a single outcome is framed in 
terms of either a gain or a loss, relative to the reference point.  
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Common methods of studying decision making under risk is to ask participants to choose 
between monetary options with probabilistic outcomes (Rieskamp & Hoffrage, 2008), choose 
between monetary options with deterministic and probabilistic outcomes (Busemeyer, 1985; 
Tversky & Kahneman, 1992), or choose between options of equal expected payoffs but with 
differing variances (Ben Zur & Breznitz, 1981). For instance, Tversky and Kahneman (1992) 
asked participants to choose between several options where the outcome of one option was 
probabilistic whereas the outcome of the other option was deterministic. The probabilistic option, 
option A, could for example yield 150$ with probability .25 and 25$ with probability .75. The 
deterministic option, option B, could for example yield 50$ with probability 1. Classic economic 
theory of decision making would predict that the option with the largest expected value would be 
preferred (Simon, 1959). The expected value      for an option     is given by summing the 
possible values     weighted by their probability of occurring    : 
 
       ∑            
The expected value for option A is then: 
 
                                
And the expected value for option B is: 
 
                   
Classic economic theory suggests that the decision maker would maximize the expected value 
and consequently choose option A over option B, since            . However, Tversky and 
Kahneman found that people don’t behave as if they try to maximize their expected value; instead 
they showed that behavior deviates systematically from what would be predicted from classical 
economic theory. Tversky and Kahneman formulated their findings in terms of risk preferences 
and suggested that people are risk aversive for gains of high probability but risk seeking for gains 
of low probability, and people are risk seeking for losses of high probability but risk aversive for 
losses of low probability. This is known as the fourfold pattern of risk preferences. 
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Figure 1. Illustration of weighting functions as described by (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). (a) The value function 
for losses is steeper than the value function for gains, making “losses loom larger than gains” (Kahneman & Tversky, 
1979, p. 279). (b) The probability weighting function defines how small probabilities are overestimated whereas 
large probabilities are underestimated. 
 
In contrast to classical economic theory, CPT (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992) predicts 
these behavioral patterns by describing the functional relationship between objective values and 
subjective utilities, and the functional relationship between objective probabilities and subjective 
decision weights. According to CPT, subjective utilities are related to objective values through a 
sigmoidal function. The relationship between objective losses and subjective losses follows a 
convex function (see figure 1a), so that negative values are deemed even more negative. On the 
other hand, the relationship between objective gains and subjective gains follows a concave 
function (see figure 1a), so that positive values are deemed less positive. In the same manner, 
objective probabilities are related to subjective decision weights by an inverse sigmoidal 
function, so that low probabilities are overestimated, whereas large probabilities are 
underestimated (see figure 1b). According to CPT, the subjective value      of an option     is 
given by: 
 
       ∑                
Where   is the weighting function for the objective probabilities and   is the utility function for 
objective values. The weighting function and the utility function are formalized with a set of free 
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parameters defining the form of the functional relationships. For instance, subjective utilities are 
related to positive objective values by the function: 
 
             
Where the parameter   is a constant between 0 and 1. If the parameter   for a hypothetical 
decision maker were .90, his subjective utility for option A in the gamble presented above would 
be 90.9$ and 14.8$. Because            , and           . Decision weights are related to 
probabilities by the function: 
 
      
  
    [   ]     
      
Where the parameter   is a constant between 0 and 1. If the parameter   for the hypothetical 
decision maker were .70, his decision weights for option A would be .29 and .63 because: 
 
      
        [     ]         
          
And: 
 
      
        [     ]         
          
The subjective value of option A is then: 
 
                                   
Option B involves no components of risk, and therefore remains the same: 
 
                    
As a result, CPT would predict that option B is preferred over option A, since              . 
In this example CPT predicts the opposite behavior than expected from a classical economic 
viewpoint. CPT also aims at describing decisions involving losses and has additional parameters 
describing weighting functions related to losses. These will be explained in detail below. 
Risky decision making and time pressure 
Although CPT successfully accounts for a wide range of decisions, its application to 
decisions made under time pressure has not been thoroughly investigated. Simon (1956) argued 
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that a model of human decision making need to account for limited time, knowledge and 
computational capacity. Similar arguments have been made by Gigerenzer, suggesting that 
people change decision strategies depending on their validity for the current problem and 
situational demands (Todd & Gigerenzer, 2007). These arguments have been supported by 
several empirical results as well as theoretical models of cognition, suggesting that decisions 
made under time pressure involves different strategies than decisions made without time 
constraints. For instance, many experimental studies of task accuracy under time pressure report a 
speed-accuracy tradeoff (Payne, Bettman, & Luce, 1996; Svenson, Edland, & Slovic, 1990; 
Zakay, 1993). When the decision maker responds under time pressure, task accuracy decrease 
compared to decisions made without time constraints. Payne, Bettman, and Luce (1996) 
suggested that the speed-accuracy tradeoff was a results of a change in decision making strategy, 
where decisions made under time pressure utilize simpler heuristic processes that rely on only 
subparts of the available information, thereby producing non-optimal responses. Similar 
suggestions were made by Rieskamp and Hoffrage (2008). They showed that when constraining 
time limits to make decisions, either indirectly by imposing costs of being slow, or directly by 
limiting the time for each decision, a simple heuristic model better predicted people’s inferences 
than a linear model integrating all available information. 
Similar predictions are made from the highly influential dual process theories of decision 
making (Evans, 2008). The core idea underlying these theories is that we possess two cognitive 
systems of thinking, one fast and intuitive, and one slow and deliberate (Kahneman, 2003; 
Kahneman & Frederick, 2002). Evans and Stanovich (2013) summarized today’s most important 
accumulated evidence under the dual process framework, and labeled these systems Type 1 and 
Type 2 processes. They describe Type 1 processes as characterized by being unconscious, rapid, 
automatic with high capacity, while type 2 processes being conscious, slow, deliberate, and with 
low capacity. Type 1 processes are assumed to underlie heuristic types of decision making, not 
capable of producing normatively correct inferences. When summarizing the broad range of 
research on these systems, Evans and Stanovich (2013) suggests that time pressure is one of the 
most effective ways of manipulating the decision making process. They propose that by 
restraining time limits to make decisions, Type 2 process are inhibited due to their slow nature, 
and only Type 1 processes are capable of producing a response. 
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The present research 
In spite of the large amount of research suggesting that decision making strategies shift as 
a function of situational demands, in particular time pressure, CPT remains silent about 
implications of time pressure on decision making processes. In particular, it is unknown if CPT is 
a good description of risky decision making under time pressure, or if simpler decision 
mechanisms like heuristics that use less information are better models of the decision making 
process. The aim of the current paper was to investigate if the same or different decision 
mechanisms govern risky choices under high time pressure as under low time pressure. CPT is 
thus accepted as an adequate description of decisions under low time pressure (for criticism of 
this view see e.g., Birnbaum, 2008; Brandstätter, Gigerenzer, & Hertwig, 2006). It was reasoned 
that if decisions were guided by the same cognitive processes under low and high time pressure, 
then CPT should adequately account of decisions under high time pressure. High time pressure 
could obviously lead to different weighting of information, but this would be captured by changes 
in parameter values of the CPT model. 
However, if decisions under high time pressure were based on a different cognitive 
process (for example a change from type 2 to type 1 process), decisions under high time pressure 
could be adequately described by simpler heuristics that use less information and do not integrate 
probability and value information. For decisions under high time pressure, two simpler, heuristic 
types of strategies are proposed: 
 Decisions are guided by evaluating the probabilities of outcomes to occur, 
ignoring other information. 
 Decisions are guided by evaluating the values of the outcomes, ignoring other 
information such as their probability of occurrence. 
The two simple heuristics were inspired by two simple mechanisms that have previously been 
used to explain decisions under risk. The heuristic that looks at the values of the outcomes only, 
were inspired by the minimax rule: choose the option with the highest minimal outcome. The 
second heuristic that looks only at probabilities was inspired by the suggestion people will choose 
the option with the lowest probability to lose anything. 
These hypotheses were investigated by analyzing data from two separate experiments. In 
both experiments, the task implied accepting or rejecting probabilistic gambles under conditions 
of high and low time pressure. The experiments were identical in all respects, except that eye-
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tracking data were collected simultaneously in one, whereas MR data were recorded 
simultaneously in the other. 
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Methods 
Participants 
A total of 45 participants (23 males and 22 females) participated in the study. Age ranged 
from 19 to 45 (M = 26.14, SD = 4.36). The complete experimental session consisted of a training 
session and the main experiment. All participants were tested individually, and experimental 
sessions lasted for about 45 minutes. All participants were informed about the task and gave 
written consent. Participants were paid a minimum of 150 NOK for their participation. 
Additionally, participants received the outcome of 10 trials randomly drawn from the 
experimental session. Participants were recruited from the University of Oslo and via 
acquaintances. 
Experimental design 
A two-alternative forced choice task was used in the two experiments presented in this 
paper. Data from experiment 1 were collected as part of an eye-tracker study, while data from 
experiment 2 were collected as part of an MR study. Apart from the different locations of data 
collection, the two experiments were identical with respect to features of the design. The task 
involved choosing between accepting and rejecting gambles with probabilistic outcomes. The 
experimental variables were time pressure (low, high) and advice (advice, no advice). The advice 
manipulation was related to a hypothesis independent of the current application, but was analyzed 
here to account for potential influences of advice on decision strategies. Both variables were 
manipulated within subjects and were fully crossed. The measured dependent variable was choice 
preferences (dichotomous). 
Material 
All gambles in the experiment consisted of one gain value with an associated probability, 
and one loss value with an associated probability. Possible gain values were [      ] and 
possible loss values were [         ]. To make the task probabilistic, both values were always 
paired with a probability from the set [        ] (see appendix A for all gambles used in the two 
experiments). All permutations of these four sets of values and probabilities give 81 unique 
compositions of gambles. Experiment 1 used all of these as gamble stimuli. Experiment 2 used 56 
of these gambles as stimuli, selected so that the whole range of expected payoffs was represented 
(see figure 2). 
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Figure 2. Expected payoffs for all gambles in the experiments. The color matrix represents all possible expected 
payoffs from the gambles in the two experiments. The expected payoff for a single gamble is: ∑       , where    is 
one outcome (either positive or negative), and       is the probability of that outcome. As illustrated in the figure, 
the absolute value of all positive and negative payoffs was identical. 
 
During a training session, participants learned to associate the values and probabilities 
constituting the gambles with different shapes. These shapes were later used to represent the 
gambles in the main experiment (see figure 3). Each shape represented either: a positive value, 
the probability of that value, a negative value or the probability of that value. All stimuli shapes 
were composed of a line with a small circle or rectangle in one endpoint, and a large circle or 
rectangle in the other endpoint. Determined by counterbalancing across participants, circles and 
rectangles represented either values or probabilities. The magnitude of both stimuli types (value 
or probability) was represented by a crossing bar, moving towards the larger endpoint in order to 
indicate greater magnitudes (either positive or negative). The stimuli shapes were presented either 
horizontally or vertically in order to represent either gains or losses and their associated 
probability, also counterbalanced across participants. The value shapes and their associated 
probability shapes were always presented horizontally next to each other, either at the top of the 
screen or at the bottom of the screen (counterbalanced across participants). All stimuli were 
composed of the same pixels, making them identical with respect to luminance and thereby 
controlling for any perceptual confounds. 
Additionally, three stimuli objects composed of circular dots were used to represent 
advice (see figure 3). Dots arranged as a cross indicated that the gamble should be rejected, dots 
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arranged as a check mark indicated that the gamble should be accepted, and dots arranged as a 
rectangle indicated that no advice were given. Similar to the gamble stimuli, the advice stimuli 
were designed to be identical by being composed of the same pixels. The accuracy of the advice 
cues, were based on observed accuracy levels from a pilot study of the experimental paradigm. 
Accuracy was operationalized as percentage of choices corresponding to what would be predicted 
from the expected payoffs of the gambles. Across the two time-pressure conditions, the mean 
accuracy in the pilot study was about 80%. Based on this, advices in the main experiment were 
drawn randomly from a Bernoulli distribution with .80 chance of success.  
Procedure 
The entire experimental procedure was administered via a computer, programmed in 
Presentation® software (Version 16.3, www.neurobs.com). Prior to the experiment, participants 
went through a training session in order to reduce potential learning effects during the 
experimental trials. The training task was identical to the experimental task, except that no 
experimental manipulations were introduced (i.e., participants had a free time-limit to respond 
and they were given no advice). In addition, the stimuli were presented against a black 
background, as opposed to a colored background used in the main experiment to indicate time 
limits. The training task lasted for 10 minutes and participants were instructed to progress at their 
own pace. At the beginning of the training session, and after every 20th trial, participants were 
presented with all experimental stimuli and their associated numeric value, in order to facilitate 
learning. 
After the training session, participants performed the main experiment. Before the 
experiment started, participants were told that they would be limited to respond within time-
limits of 2 seconds or 15 seconds, corresponding to the time pressure manipulation. If no 
response was given within the time limits, the experiment still progressed to the next trial. 
Participants were also told that they would receive an advice in half of the trials, based on the 
behavior of other participants. Additionally, participants were told that they would receive the 
outcome of 10 randomly drawn trials at the end of the experiment. To make sure participants 
understood the task, they performed 20 practice trials identical to the experimental trials, before 
the experiment started. 
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Figure 3. Illustration of experimental paradigm. Between each trial a fixation period (Fixation) were presented for 
1.5 seconds in experiment 1, and for random intervals between 3 and 10 seconds in experiment 2. The long inter 
stimuli interval (ISI) was necessary in the FMRI experiment because trial specific activation was of interest. In the 
response trials (Response) the stimuli were presented and participants decided to accept or reject the gamble. Under 
conditions of high time pressure participants had a maximum of 2 seconds to give a response, whereas under 
conditions of low time pressure participants had a maximum of 15 seconds to give a response. The background color 
of the stimulus screen (blue or green) indicated whether time pressure was low or high. “Motta” (Norwegian for 
accept) and “avslå” (Norwegian for reject) were printed in the lower corners, instructing participants which button to 
press for the desired action. 
 
The two experiments consisted of 324 trials in experiment 1 and 224 trials in experiment 
2, distributed across four blocks of 81 and 56 trials, respectively. The presentation sequence of 
the gambles were randomized within the four experimental conditions, with the constraint that 
the same gambles were presented under all conditions, making sure no bias was introduced 
between conditions by properties of the gambles. Time pressure was manipulated block wise so 
that a single block contained only trials of high time pressure or low time pressure. Block-
sequence was counterbalanced across individuals with the constraint that conditions always were 
interspersed. Average duration of low time-pressure blocks were 6.5 minutes (SD = 1.6), while 
average duration of high time-pressure blocks were 4.8 minutes (SD = 1.4). At the beginning of 
each block, a screen informed the participants whether the time limit to respond for the following 
block of trials was 2 seconds or 15 seconds. Advice was manipulated within each block, in series 
of four trials of advice or no advice. 
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Modelling decision making behavior 
In order to investigate the effect of time pressure on decision making, the approach of the 
current paper was to explicitly formalize the hypothesized processes as statistical models. The 
approach is advantageous because it allow quantification of aspects of the decision making 
process, and thereby objective valuation of the proposed processes by assessing model fit. 
However, the approach is also limited because of the great complexity underlying human 
cognition, something that is impossible to capture in a specific model. Below the models used to 
investigate decisions is outlined. 
Cumulative prospect theory 
CPT has been formalized as a mathematical model, compromising several free parameters 
describing the decision making process (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Nilsson, Rieskamp, & 
Wagenmakers, 2011; Prelec, 1998; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). According to CPT, the 
subjective value    of a gamble   is: 
 
       ∑                 
For the current study, the model was extended to incorporate advice as a free parameter allowed 
to influence the subjective value of a gamble: 
 
      ∑                    
Where   is a scalar accounting for the possible influence of advice   on the subjective value of a 
gamble. The advice manipulation was coded -1 if the advice was to reject the gamble, 0 if no 
advice was present, and 1 if the advice was to accept the gamble.   would therefore represent the 
value that would be added or subtracted to the subjective value of the gamble depending on the 
direction of the advice. 
The term   denotes the subjective weighting function of the probability   of outcome  . 
The weighting function is given by: 
 
      
  
    [   ]     
       
Where     if the probability is associated with gains, and     if the probability is associated 
with losses. Because CPT assumes that the probability weighting function can differ for 
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probabilities associated with gains and probabilities associated with losses, the model have 
separate parameters. 
Similarly to probabilities, the subjective weighting function for values is assumed to differ 
for gains and losses, and is given by: 
 
     {
      
           
       
Where   modulates the curvature of the subjective values for gains, while   modulates the 
curvature of the subjective value for losses. To maintain the assumptions underlying CPT that the 
value function for gains follows a concave function, while the value function for losses follow a 
convex function, these parameters are restricted to the interval [   ]. As   and   approaches 1, 
the difference between subjective values and objective values will decrease.   is a scaling 
parameter indicating loss aversion. If   equals 1, it will have no impact on the value function for 
losses, suggesting no loss aversion. However, if   is greater than 1, the subjective value of losses 
will be scaled to have an even larger impact, thereby suggesting loss aversion, which is one of the 
key assumptions of CPT.  
Given equation 11-14 presented above, it is possible to estimate the subjective value of all 
gambles presented in the experiment. One could therefore assume that the decision maker will 
accept the gamble if        , and reject the gamble if        . However, such consistent 
behavior is rarely observed in human behavior. Instead risky choices are assumed to incorporate a 
certain degree of randomness. Therefore, the suggestion by Nilsson et al. (2011) to incorporate a 
probabilistic choice rule was used. The choice rule gives the probability of accepting a gamble 
     based on its subjective value and follows a logistic function: 
 
     
 
               
       
Where   modulates the curvature of the choice rule. For instance, if    , responses will be 
random since         . The greater   exceeds 0, the greater the responses will be determined 
by the subjective value       of the gamble. 
To summarize, the CPT model includes seven parameters.   denotes advice.   and   
denotes the curvature for the probability weighting function for gains and losses, respectively.   
denotes the curvature for the weighting function for gains, while   denotes the curvature for the 
weighting function for losses.   denotes loss aversion, while   denotes the extent to which 
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choices is governed by subjective values. Together these parameters determine the probability 
that a decision maker will accept a given gamble. 
Heuristic models 
As opposed to CPT, the two proposed heuristic models suggest a much simpler decision 
making process. The first model, heuristic probability (HP), assumes that the subjective value of 
a gamble       is based solely on the difference in probabilities for the positive outcome and the 
negative outcome: 
 
        (     )                 
Consequently, a gamble where the probability of gain is larger than the probability of loss will 
have a positive value, and vice versa. A similar choice rule to that of the CPT model was used, 
were the probability of acceptance follows a logistic function: 
 
     
 
               
       
Where   modulates the curvature of the choice function. If   equals 0 it means that the decision 
maker are not influenced by the differences in probabilities for gains and losses. However, as   
exceeds 0, the decisions maker will be more guided by the differences in probabilities. 
The second model, heuristic magnitude (HM), assumes that the subjective value of a 
gamble       is based solely on the sum of the positive outcome and the negative outcome: 
 
       ∑                    
Consequently, for a gamble where the gain value is larger than absolute loss value, the sum will 
be positive, and vice versa. The same choice rule as for the HP model where used to describe to 
what extend the decision makers probability of accepting a gamble is guided by the sum of the 
values in the gamble. However, the scaling parameter for the curvature of the choice function is 
denoted   instead of  . 
Statistical estimation of model parameters 
When data are nested within subgroups of the entire dataset, accuracy can be improved by 
modeling the multiple levels of information (Greenland, 2000) This class of statistical models is 
often referred to as hierarchical models or multilevel models (Gelman & Hill, 2007). The data 
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analyzed in this paper follows such a structure: data points are measured within subjects at the 
first level, and subjects within the group of subjects at the second level. This motives estimation 
of parameters both at a subject-level as well as at a group-level. Nilsson et al. (2011) proposed a 
hierarchical model based on Bayesian methods for estimating the parameters compromising CPT 
and created a program in WinBUGS for estimation of model parameters. Through simulation 
they showed that their model was able to accurately estimate the parameters of interest. For the 
current application I modified the model proposed by Nilsson et al. (2011) to fit the current 
experiments, and also modified the WinBUGS code to allow estimation of parameters. A 
hierarchical approach was also used to estimate the parameters underlying the heuristic models. 
Bayesian modelling 
All analysis in the current paper was based on Bayesian statistical procedures. In 
Bayesian statistics, parameters themselves are considered random variables (Gelman & Hill, 
2007). Bayesian estimation requires definition of uncertainty about parameters before the model 
is fit to the data. This is known as prior distributions. In this paper, all prior distributions were 
modeled as uninformative, so that their influence on the later parameter estimates was minimal. 
This was done by setting their range of uncertainty clearly wider than the range of reasonable 
values of the parameters. The goal of Bayesian estimation is to obtain the posterior distribution of 
the model parameters. The posterior distribution describes uncertainty in parameter estimates 
given observed data, and can thus be used for inferential purposes (Gelman & Hill, 2007). In the 
current paper, posterior distributions were approximated through Marcov-Chain Monte-Carlo 
(MCMC) techniques, which allow sampling from the posterior distribution. The model 
implementations relies on WinBUGS (D. Lunn, Spiegelhalter, Thomas, & Best, 2009; D. J. Lunn, 
Thomas, Best, & Spiegelhalter, 2000). WinBUGS is a general purpose statistical software for 
Bayesian analysis that uses MCMC techniques to sample from the posterior distribution of the 
model parameters. The package R2WinBUGS (Sturtz, Ligges, & Gelman, 2005) was used to run 
WinBUGS through the statistical software R (R Core Team, 2014). 
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Results 
Parameter recovery study 
Because the current application extended the CPT model, a parameter recovery study was 
performed to ensure that the model were able to adequately recover parameters from a simulated 
dataset where the true parameters are known. Three simulations were done, only differing in their 
sample size. The first used the same sample size as in the experiments (N = 45). The two last 
simulations used larger sample sizes (N = 100 & N = 200) in order to reduce the influence of 
random error in data, and thereby give an indication of whether the method yields unbiased 
estimates. 
The CPT model is thoroughly described by Nilsson et al. (2011) and will therefore not be 
fully outlined here. For the simulation study, the only difference made was to extend the model to 
incorporate advice  . Individual advice parameters were assumed to come from a group level 
normal distribution,       
     . Prior distributions for the group level mean,   , and 
standard deviation,     was set to be uninformative. The mean was described with a normal 
distribution,            . The standard deviation was described with a uniform distribution 
           , which is typically considered uninformative since extreme values are considered 
apriori equal to more reasonable values (Gelman & Hill, 2007). 
The hierarchical models implemented in this study make assumptions about the structure 
of the data. Instead of assuming that all participants have the same true parameter values, it is 
assumed that participants have individual parameter values coming from a distribution of true 
parameter values. This introduces two levels of error; the estimate for a given subject    is 
sampled    from a distribution with a true parameter   , and this true parameter is again sampled 
   from a distribution over all true parameters with mean  
 . This data structure was 
implemented in the data generation. 
 
           
              
 
To assess performance of the model, 112 responses from each of 45, 100, and 200 fictive 
subjects were simulated. Data were simulated using the same gambles as those presented in the 
real experiments. The true parameter values were based on those reported by Tversky and 
Kahneman (1992). For each fictive subject, parameter values were drawn from the following 
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distributions:              ,              ,              ,              , 
              ,              , and             . These parameters were used to calculate 
the subjective value for each gamble (i.e., equation 11-14 above). Trial specific responses was 
then simulated from the Bernoulli distribution with probability of accept given by the inverse 
logit transformation of the subjective value. Note that the method will only produce a sample, so 
that random error contributes to data both within subjects and between subjects. Perfect recovery 
of parameters is thus not expected no matter how accurate the estimation procedure is. 
Posterior distributions for each simulation were approximated by a total of 30000 MCMC 
samples from 3 chains. The first 5000 estimates from each chain were excluded in order to obtain 
more representative starting value. Chain-convergence was assessed by computing the  ̂ statistic 
(Gelman & Rubin, 1992) and visual inspection of trace plots for all posterior distributions. All 
diagnostics indicated that the chain had converged.  ̂ was below 1.1 for all parameters and there 
were no indication of the chain being stuck in particular areas of the parameter space as indicated 
from the trace plots. Additionally, auto-correlations were virtually non-existent at lag from 1 to 
50, indicating good mixing of the chain.  
Table 1 summarizes the main results from each of the simulation studies. The data is 
summarized with the mean and standard deviation (SD), of the posterior distributions for all 
parameters at the group-level of the model. Figure 4 shows the true distribution of parameters and 
the posterior distributions of the recovered parameter estimates from all three simulations. 
 
Table 1. 
Results from parameter recovery study. Table presents mean point estimate for the recovered parameter estimates 
with standard deviations in parenthesis. Rows represent each of the simulation studies with differing number of 
simulated subjects (N). 
 Parameter 
 
  
.88 (.05) 
   
.88 (.05) 
  
.61 (.05) 
  
.69 (.05) 
  
2.25 (.10) 
  
1.50 (.10) 
  
.50 (.10) 
N = 45 .92 (.03) .90 (.04) .73 (.05) .93 (.03) 2.45 (.34) 1.14 (.09) .72 (.20) 
N = 100 .84 (.04) .91 (.03) .90 (.04) .88 (.03) 2.19 (.26) 1.20 (.11) .55 (.14) 
N = 200 .87 (.04) .90 (.03) .85 (.03) .84 (.02) 2.29 (.31) 1.16 (.10) .57 (.13) 
 
First, consider the value function parameters   and  . Both their mean and variability, as 
indicated by their SD, are near to perfect recovered in all three simulations. Recovery of the mean 
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for the probability weighting parameters   and   is not as satisfactory as the value function 
parameters. The mean of both parameters tend to be overestimated, but the variability is 
reasonably recovered. The loss aversion parameter   seem to be adequately recovered if one 
consider the estimates of the mean, and seem to be improving as a function of larger sample 
sizes, as one should expect from an unbiased estimator. However, its variability is quite 
overestimated, with a factor of about 3. Since CPT is mostly used as a descriptive model of the 
decision making process, as is the case in the current paper, estimates of the mean are more 
important than estimates of variability, since these serve as point estimates for the parameters. 
The sensitivity parameter   seems to be systematically underestimated, as is evident by estimates 
not improving as a function of sample size. However, the SD estimates are near to perfect. The 
advice parameter   are recovered with an satisfactory error rate. Estimates of both mean and SD 
are quite good under all simulations, and both seem to improve as a function of sample size. 
 
 
Figure 4. Posterior distributions of the group-level means under each simulation. The dotted lines represent the true 
distribution used to generate the data. The red lines represents the posterior distributions from the simulation when N 
= 45. The green lines represents the posterior distributions from the simulation when N = 100. The blue line 
represents the posterior distributions from the simulation when N = 200.  
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Overall, most parameters seem to be adequately recovered. Systematic deviations 
appeared for the probability weighting parameters   and  , as well as the sensitivity parameter  . 
It should however be emphasized the current parameter recovery study is not adequately suited to 
separate random error from systematic error, and it is therefore not appropriate to draw strong 
conclusions about whether estimators are biased. It should also be noted that CPT is a complex 
model, which inevitably makes parameter estimation difficult (Nilsson et al., 2011). Overall, 
results resemble those from Nilsson et al. (2011).  
Training 
Before fitting the decision making models to the experimental data, I investigated 
accuracy levels across training trials. The training trials were included in order to reduce 
unwanted training effects during the main experiment, but also to ensure that participants 
properly understood the task. Accuracy levels from the training sessions therefore serve as 
exclusion criteria for participants not understanding the task. Accuracy was operationalized as to 
what extent choice behavior conformed to what would be predicted from the expected payoffs of 
the gambles. A gamble with a positive payoff should thus be accepted, while a gamble with a 
negative payoff should be rejected. Here, accuracy for gambles with 0 in expected payoff stays 
undefined and such trials were therefore excluded from the analysis. 
Accuracy was assessed using a hierarchical Bayesian model, with a binomial link function 
between the model and the accuracy levels as the response variable. Individual accuracy 
levels,   , were transformed with a logit transformation, assumed to come from a group level 
normal distribution,       
     . Prior distributions for the group level mean,   , and 
standard deviation,     was set to be uninformative. The mean was described with a uniform 
distribution,          , thus considering all accuracy levels equally likely apriori. The 
standard deviation was also described with a uniform distribution,            .  
Posterior distributions were approximated by a total of 30000 MCMC samples from 3 
chains, were the first 5000 samples were discarded in order to obtain more representative starting 
values. Chain convergence was assessed by computing the  ̂ statistic, visual inspection of trace 
plots, and by investigating autocorrelations up to 50 lags.  ̂ was below 1.05 for all parameters 
and there was no indication of the chain being stuck in particular areas of the parameter space. 
Additionally, autocorrelations were virtually non-existent, indication good mixing of the chain. 
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Results showed that at the group-level, accuracy levels were high (M = .96) with low 
inter-individual variability (SD = .04). These results indicate that most participants properly 
learned the task. To assess individual accuracy levels, the posterior distribution for each 
individual were evaluated against what would be expected from random responding (i.e.,    
  ). Inferences about whether accuracy reached satisfactory levels were made by evaluating 
whether the 95% highest density interval (HDI) of the posterior distribution excluded .5. The 
HDI refers to the 95% of the posterior distribution with the highest density, and can be 
interpreted as the 95% most likely parameter values. The HDI share many properties with a 
parametric confidence interval, but will differ for distributions not symmetrical about the mean. 
In Bayesian statistics, the HDI is a common summary of the posterior distribution (Kruschke, 
2010). The 95% HDI was not above .5 for three participants (see appendix B and figure 5). These 
were excluded from further analysis of the main experiments. 
 
Figure 5. Running means plot of cumulative accuracy across trials for each participant. The dotted line represents 
expected accuracy if responses were guided by a random process. Lines marked with a red asterix indicate accuracy 
levels of participants whom were excluded from further analysis. As is evident from the figure, these participants 
deviated greatly from the general levels of accuracy. 
Experiment 
For the analysis of the data from the experimental trials, three subjects were excluded, 
leaving 42 participants for the subsequent analysis. The goal of the first analysis was to fit the 
CPT model to choice preferences under high time-pressure and low time-pressure. The only 
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difference in the model from the simulation study was that parameters were estimated 
simultaneously under high and low time pressure.  
To fit the CPT model, a total number of 30000 MCMC samples from 3 chains were 
obtained to approximate the posterior distributions. Chain convergence was assessed by 
computing the  ̂statistic, visual inspection of trace plots for all parameters, and by investigating 
autocorrelations up to 50 lags.  ̂ was below 1.1 for all parameters, there was no indication of the 
chain being stuck in particular areas of the parameter space, and autocorrelations were non-
existent. 
Table 2 summarizes the main results from fitting CPT under conditions of high time-
pressure and low time-pressure. Table 2 shows the mean point estimate and SD in parenthesis for 
the estimated group-level parameters of the CPT model.  
Table 2 
Results from fitting the CPT model to the experimental data. Mean point estimate and standard deviations enclosed 
in parenthesis for the group level parameters under conditions of high time pressure and low time pressure. 
 Parameter      
 
 
              
High time pressure .43 (.05) .26 (.05) .86 (.04) .44 (.04) 2.08 (.25) 2.72 (.35) .16 (.15) 
Low time pressure .72 (.05) .55 (.06) .84 (.04) .69 (.05) 1.52 (.14) 2.45 (.34) .18 (.15) 
 
The first notable aspect of table 2 is that except for   and  , all mean point estimates are lower 
for decisions made under high time-pressure than decisions made under low time-pressure. To 
evaluate these differences, the posterior distribution for each parameter under high time pressure 
was subtracted from the posterior distribution of the same parameter estimated under low time 
pressure (see figure 6 below). This procedure accounts for correlations between repeated 
measures in the variability of the difference scores. Confidence in these differences was 
established by evaluating whether their 95% HDI excluded 0. An index of confidence that the 
difference is unequal to 0 was calculated as the proportion of the empirical distribution below or 
above 0. Reliable differences were found for the gain value parameter   (95% HDI = [.16, .42], 
p( |low time pressure >  |high time pressure) = 1.00) as well as for the loss value parameter   
(95% HDI = [.16, .44], p( |low time pressure >  |high time pressure) = 1.00). At the individual 
level, the direction of the effect (indicated by the mean-difference) for   was the same for 100% 
of the participants, and for 95% of the participants for  . These results indicate that the weighting 
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of both negative values and positive values decreases in decisions made under high time pressure 
as compared to decisions made under low time pressure. No difference between high and low 
time pressure conditions were found for the probability parameter associated with gains   (95% 
HDI = [-.14, .09], p( |low time pressure >  |high time pressure) = .36), where 38% of the 
participants parameter estimates decreased. However, the probability parameter associated with 
losses,   was lower under high time pressure than low time pressure (95% HDI = [.14, .37], 
p( |low time pressure >  |high time pressure) = 1.00). This effect was present for 100% of the 
participants, indicating that the weighting of probabilities associated with losses decreased under 
time pressure. In addition, the loss aversion parameter  , increased as a result of time pressure 
(95% HDI = [-1.14, 0.00], p( |high time pressure >  |high low pressure) = .98), and this effect 
was present for 86% of the participants. No difference between the conditions were found for the 
sensitivity parameter   (95% HDI = [-1.20, 0.66], p( |1ow time pressure >  |1ow high pressure) 
= .28) where 40% of the participants decreased under high time pressure. Nor were any 
difference between the conditions found for the advice parameter   (95% HDI = [-.38, .46], 
p( |low time pressure >  |high time pressure) = .55), where 62% the participants decreased 
under time pressure. Since there were no differences in the advice parameter between the 
conditions, the advice manipulation will not be further discussed. 
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Figure 6. Posterior distributions for the group-level means under conditions of high time pressure and low time 
pressure. The red lines represent the posterior distributions for the parameter estimates under high time pressure. The 
blue lines represent the posterior distributions for the parameter estimates under low time pressure. 
 
The second notable aspect of table 2 is that the point estimates for the loss aversion 
parameter   is greater than 1 under both conditions, thus indicating a general tendency for loss 
aversion under both conditions of time pressure. Therefore, it was additionally evaluated if   was 
greater than one in each of the time pressure conditions separately. Results showed that loss 
aversion was present under low time pressure (95% HDI = [1.26, 1.81], p( |low time pressure > 
 ) = 1.00) and under high time pressure (95% HDI = [1.59, 2.55], p( |high time pressure > 1) = 
1.00). While   has no direct interpretation on its own, it should be greater than 0 to indicate that 
choices are not random. Therefore it was also evaluated weather   was greater than 0 in both 
conditions separately. Under low time pressure   exceeded 0 (95% HDI = [1.82, 3.13], p( |low 
time pressure > 0) = 1.00), and under high time pressure   exceeded 0 (95% HDI = [2.04, 3.44], 
p( |high time pressure > 0) = 1.00). 
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Figure 7. Estimated value functions under both time pressure conditions. The black lines represents the value 
function estimated from the mean of the group level parameters, whereas the grey lines indicates the value function 
estimated from the mean of each participant’s own parameters. 
 
Using the mean of the parameters  ,  , and   to estimate the value functions show 
substantial functional changes between conditions (see figure 7). Generally, the value function 
flattens out as an effect of time pressure suggesting that under time pressure, decision makers is 
less sensitive to variation in positive and negative values. For instance, the average participant’s 
estimated subjective utility of 5 under low time pressure is          . Whereas the average 
participant’s estimated subjective utility of 5 under high time pressure is          . The same 
effect is evident for negative values. For instance, the average participant’s estimated subjective 
utility of -5 under low time pressure is                    . Whereas the average 
participant’s estimated subjective utility of -5 under high time pressure is               
     . The results also shows that the absolute utility of -5 is greater than the absolute utility of 5 
under both conditions, supporting the assumption of CPT that losses in general are more 
important for decisions than gains. 
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Figure 8. Estimated weighting functions under both time pressure conditions. The black lines represents the 
weighting function estimated from the mean of the group level parameters, whereas the grey lines indicates the 
weighting function estimated from the mean of each participant’s own parameters. The two upper graphs show the 
weighting function for probabilities associated with gains. The two lower graphs show the weighting function for 
probabilities associated with losses. 
 
Using the mean of the parameters   and   to estimate the weighting functions under both 
conditions shows an interesting pattern (see figure 8). Under low time pressure, both functions 
approach a linear function, indicating that probabilities are weighted close to optimal from an 
expected utility perspective. However, under high time pressure, only probabilities associated 
with gains approaches a linear function whereas probabilities associated with losses flattens out. 
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For instance, under low time pressure, the estimated decision weight for a probability of .8 
associated with gains is: 
 
     
       [    ]         
            
Whereas the estimated decision weight for a probability of .8 associated with losses is: 
 
     
       [    ]         
            
Both estimates are relatively close to the objective probability of .8, especially the weighting of 
probabilities associated with gains. Under high time pressure, the estimated decision weight for a 
probability of .8 associated with gains is: 
 
     
       [    ]         
            
Very close to the weight under low time pressure. However, the estimated decision weight for a 
probability of .8 associated with losses decreases: 
 
     
       [    ]         
            
The results suggests that under low time pressure, participants is sensitive to probabilities 
associated with both gains and losses, but under high time pressure, their sensitivity decreases 
substantially for probabilities associated with losses, but not for gains. 
 Evaluating these results together, one pattern emerges. Under high time pressure 
participants seem to be less sensitive to all information except the probability of gains. That is, 
the subjective values for both gains and losses decreases, and the decisions weight for 
probabilities associated with losses decreases. No such effect was found for probabilities 
associated with gains. 
Model comparison 
The goal of the second analysis of the experimental data was to fit the simpler models 
representing a heuristic decision making process, to the data. Thereby allow assessing whether 
either of these adequately described decisions made under high time pressure. 
Both the HP and the HM model were fitted as hierarchical models, with a Bernoulli 
distribution as the link function between the model and the choice preferences as response 
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variable. At the individual level, both the HP and the HM model only have one parameter   and 
 , which is a scalar for the predictor variable representing the heuristic decision rule.  
Both parameters were assumed to come from group level normal distributions, 
      
      and       
     . Prior distributions for the group level means was described 
with uninformative normal distributions,             and            . Standard 
deviations were described with uninformative uniform distributions,             and 
           . 
Posterior distributions were approximated by a total of 30000 MCMC samples obtained 
from three chains, were the first 5000 samples in each chain were discarded in order to obtain 
more representative starting values. Chain convergence was assessed by computing the  ̂ 
statistic, inspection of trace plots, and by investigating autocorrelations up to 50 lags.  ̂ was 
below 1.01 for all parameters. There was no indication of the chain being stuck in particular areas 
of the parameter space and autocorrelations were non-existent. 
The parameters of the heuristic models have no direct interpretation on their own, except 
for their direction and whether they are different from 0. The results showed that the group level 
estimate of the HP model was well above 0 (M = 3.48, SD = .29, 95% HDI = [2.91, 4.06], 
p( |high time pressure > 0) = 1.00). The results suggest that as the magnitude of the difference 
for the probability of gain and the probability for loss increased, participants tendency to accept 
the gamble increased. The same pattern was found for the HM model (M = .13, SD = .04, 95% 
HDI = [.05, .20], p( |high time pressure > 0) = 1.00), suggesting as the sum of the magnitude for 
gains and loss increased, participants tendency to accept the gambles increased. Together these 
results suggest that both proposed heuristic models offer possible explanation for the decisions 
made under high time pressure.  
 
Table 3.  
Results from comparing fit for all models under high time pressure.  ̅ is the mean of the model-level deviance.    is 
the effective number of parameters in the model.     is the model fit statistic. 
  ̅        
HM 7703.90 44.29 7748.19 
HP 6793.03 38.16 6831.19 
CPT 5130.98 273.37 5404.35 
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To investigate whether decision making under high time pressure could be adequately 
described by some of the proposed heuristic models, the deviance information criterion (DIC) 
(Spiegelhalter, Best, Carlin, & Van Der Linde, 2002) was used to index model fit. Table 3 show 
the main results from evaluating DIC for each of the three models under conditions of high time 
pressure. Note that DIC is a compromise between the fit of the model and the effective number of 
parameters defining the model, so that models with many parameters are penalized.  
As is evident from table 3, CPT offered a better description of the data than either of the 
proposed alternative models. Consequently, results do not support the second hypotheses that 
decision made under high time pressure may be adequately explained by simple heuristic models. 
However, it is of interest that the model based only on the probabilities of the gambles (HP) 
offers a much better description of choice preferences than the model based only on the values in 
the gambles (HM).  
DECISION MAKING UNDER TIME PRESSURE  29 
Discussion 
The goal of the current study was to investigate decisions made under high time pressure 
as compared to decisions made under low time pressure. For this aim, a probabilistic decision 
making task was used in two experimental studies. It was investigated whether CPT was able to 
adequately describe decision under high time pressure, or if a simpler heuristic decision model, 
that are not a subset of CPT, could adequately describe decisions under time pressure. The latter 
would imply a shift in decision strategy when people are put under time constraints. 
CPT and time pressure 
Estimates of several central parameters in the CPT model were lower under high time 
pressure than under low time pressure. Results showed that under time pressure, the relative 
weight put on both negative and positive values as well as probabilities associated with losses, 
decreased substantially. This trend was not observed for probabilities associated with gains for 
which the decision weights remained the same independent of time pressure. This pattern is 
evident from figure 7 and 8; the probability of gains and their associated decisions weights is the 
only relationship approaching a linear function in both conditions. It was also found that loss 
aversion increased under high time pressure compared to low time pressure. 
The results suggest that under time pressure, people ignore, or put less weight on, most 
information except the probability of gains. These results are in accordance with Maule, Hockey 
& Bdzola (2000) who found that time pressure led to a decreased influence of negative 
information on decisions. However, earlier findings (Ben Zur & Breznitz, 1981; Wallsten, 1993) 
found an increased priority for negative information for decisions made under time pressure. 
Although these results conflict on which information becomes central under time pressure, all 
suggest that time pressure leads to unbalanced weighting of the available information. One 
possible explanation could be that people try to use a truncated version of the integrative 
approach also under high time pressure, but that there simply isn’t enough time to process more 
than only a small part of the information. It is still unclear why people systematically base their 
decisions to a large extend on the probability of positive outcomes, and not for instance, the 
magnitude of the positive outcome.  
Shift in decision making process 
Since CPT offered a better description of decisions under high time pressure than either of 
the proposed simpler heuristics, the results offers no direct support for the hypothesis that time 
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pressure leads to a shift in decision making processes. However, a shift in decisions making 
strategy under time pressure still seems plausible in light of the results. Several of the studies who 
have reported a change in decision making strategy have either used a less stringent time limit 
than the current study (Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1988; Svenson et al., 1990), or manipulated 
time indirectly by imposing cost of being slow (Payne et al., 1996; Rieskamp & Hoffrage, 2008). 
The current study used a time limit of 2 seconds, which clearly limits the amount of information 
than can be processed to an even larger extent. As such, it is likely necessary to switch to even 
simpler decision strategies to adapt to the demanding environment. One such strategy could be to 
try to avoid losses, instead of trying to maximize income. Such an explanation is supported by the 
finding that loss aversion increased under time pressure. If people only based their decisions on 
the probability of gains under time pressure, they effectively exclude many of the situations 
where the long term payout would be negative. Although not optimal, following such a strategy is 
clearly better than responding at random, and might serve as an adaptive strategy when 
situational demands to a large extend limits processing resources. 
Limitations 
One limitation of the present research concerns the nature of the gambles presented in the 
experiments. Because real money was used as incentives, it was not possible to investigate 
decisions concerning actual losses. That is, participants could not actually lose money; they could 
only reduce their reward. It is possible that situations where actual losses are present might 
dictate other decision strategies. 
There are also inherent limitations in using model comparison as a tool for inferences 
concerning the underlying cognitive process. Because one model explains data marginally better 
than others, it does not necessarily mean that this model is the correct and only representation of 
the true underlying process. Empirical investigations of models explaining cognitive processes 
will necessitate relatively simple models, and one may thereby not recognize the possibility that 
several cognitive processes may coexist and interact to produce the observed behavioral 
responses. As there are undeniable many possible relationships and interactions between time and 
decision making, it seems unlikely that a single model that may be fitted to observed data, will be 
able to encompass the complete decision-making system. 
DECISION MAKING UNDER TIME PRESSURE  31 
Conclusions 
By using sophisticated models of the decision making process, the current study may aid a 
deeper understanding of the effect of time pressure on risky decision making. In summary, the 
research show that time pressure has a substantial effect on decisions. It was shown that under 
time pressure, the probability of a positive outcome to a large degree guided decisions while 
other information was mostly ignored or undermined. It was further shown that CPT offered the 
best account for decisions under high time pressure than any of the proposed heuristic models. 
 Although results showed significant changes in parameters of the CPT model when time 
constraints were introduced, it is still unclear whether this reflects a qualitative change in decision 
mechanisms, or a more quantitative change in how values and probabilities are integrated. Such 
conclusion would be more warranted if either of the simpler models had offered a fit comparable 
to - or better than - CPT under conditions of high time pressure. 
The suggested alternative models for decisions made under high time pressure also 
represent a very small subset of possible alternative models. Besides the models investigated in 
the current research, there are a number of models describing heuristics types of decision making 
processes with a solid theoretical foundation (Birnbaum, 2008; Brandstätter et al., 2006; 
Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996; Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 2002; Payne et al., 1996; Rieskamp, 
2008). Future investigations of alternative models may support conclusions different from those 
proposed in the present study. 
The same applies to future investigations using other methods. Eye tracking and fMRI 
should investigate if the results is also supported by processing variables including dwell times, 
pupil dilation, and representation of gambling information in the brain. Additional behavioral 
studies and/or computational modeling should further investigate the boundary conditions under 
which CPT is a good description of risky decision making under time pressure. 
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Appendix A: Table of gamble stimuli 
The following gambles were used in the two experiments. Those marked with an asterix 
were excluded from the FMRI experiment. Gain and loss denotes the value of the positive and 
negative outcomes. P(gain) and P(loss) denotes the probability of the gain value and loss value 
occurring, respectively. 
                              
1* 12 0.2 -12 0.2 
2* 12 0.2 -12 0.4 
3 12 0.2 -12 0.8 
4* 12 0.2 -3 0.2 
5 12 0.2 -3 0.4 
6* 12 0.2 -3 0.8 
7* 12 0.2 -6 0.2 
8* 12 0.2 -6 0.4 
9 12 0.2 -6 0.8 
10* 12 0.4 -12 0.2 
11 12 0.4 -12 0.4 
12 12 0.4 -12 0.8 
13 12 0.4 -3 0.2 
14* 12 0.4 -3 0.4 
15 12 0.4 -3 0.8 
16 12 0.4 -6 0.2 
17 12 0.4 -6 0.4 
18* 12 0.4 -6 0.8 
19 12 0.8 -12 0.2 
20 12 0.8 -12 0.4 
21* 12 0.8 -12 0.8 
22 12 0.8 -3 0.2 
23 12 0.8 -3 0.4 
24 12 0.8 -3 0.8 
25 12 0.8 -6 0.2 
26 12 0.8 -6 0.4 
27 12 0.8 -6 0.8 
28 3 0.2 -12 0.2 
29 3 0.2 -12 0.4 
30 3 0.2 -12 0.8 
31 3 0.2 -3 0.2 
32 3 0.2 -3 0.4 
33* 3 0.2 -3 0.8 
34 3 0.2 -6 0.2 
35 3 0.2 -6 0.4 
36 3 0.2 -6 0.8 
DECISION MAKING UNDER TIME PRESSURE  37 
37 3 0.4 -12 0.2 
38* 3 0.4 -12 0.4 
39 3 0.4 -12 0.8 
40 3 0.4 -3 0.2 
41 3 0.4 -3 0.4 
42* 3 0.4 -3 0.8 
43* 3 0.4 -6 0.2 
44 3 0.4 -6 0.4 
45 3 0.4 -6 0.8 
46 3 0.8 -12 0.2 
47 3 0.8 -12 0.4 
48 3 0.8 -12 0.8 
49 3 0.8 -3 0.2 
50* 3 0.8 -3 0.4 
51 3 0.8 -3 0.8 
52 3 0.8 -6 0.2 
53* 3 0.8 -6 0.4 
54 3 0.8 -6 0.8 
55* 6 0.2 -12 0.2 
56 6 0.2 -12 0.4 
57 6 0.2 -12 0.8 
58 6 0.2 -3 0.2 
59* 6 0.2 -3 0.4 
60 6 0.2 -3 0.8 
61 6 0.2 -6 0.2 
62 6 0.2 -6 0.4 
63* 6 0.2 -6 0.8 
64* 6 0.4 -12 0.2 
65 6 0.4 -12 0.4 
66 6 0.4 -12 0.8 
67 6 0.4 -3 0.2 
68 6 0.4 -3 0.4 
69* 6 0.4 -3 0.8 
70 6 0.4 -6 0.2 
71 6 0.4 -6 0.4 
72* 6 0.4 -6 0.8 
73 6 0.8 -12 0.2 
74* 6 0.8 -12 0.4 
75 6 0.8 -12 0.8 
76 6 0.8 -3 0.2 
77 6 0.8 -3 0.4 
78 6 0.8 -3 0.8 
79* 6 0.8 -6 0.2 
80* 6 0.8 -6 0.4 
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81 6 0.8 -6 0.8 
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Appendix B: Results from training 
The figure show posterior distributions of accuracy levels for all participants from the 
training session. The dotted lines show the point where responses were considered random (i.e., 
.5). Participant 18, 20 and 43 were excluded due to unsatisfactory accuracy levels.  
 
